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Foreword 
In 2009 I retired from Industrivärden, a major Swedish industrial holding company, where I 
served as a group controller for many years. After retirement I was commissioned to write a 
book about Industrivärden´s history from its founding in 1944. The book was published in 
2010. 
In 2011 I resumed my academic studies in Lund where I originally graduated in 1970 in 
Business Administration. My renewed studies first focused on History of Ideas and Sciences 
and then on Economic History. My Bachelor Essay in Economic History essentially concerns 
a comparison between the two major Swedish banks Svenska Handelsbanken and S-E-Banken 
with the purpose to verify my hypothesis that the low risk profile of Handelsbanken has 
resulted in a better financial outcome over the last thirty years than that of S-E-Banken. 
Industrivärden has been a shareholder of Handelsbanken since 1963 and is today one of the 
two major shareholders of the bank. The links between Industrivärden and Handelsbanken are 
very tight. I have therefore asked Anders Nyrén who has been President of Industrivärden and 
member of the Handelsbanken board since 2001 and who as from 2013 also has been elected 
Chairman of Handelsbanken to grant me an interview, which he kindly has agreed to. 
Furthermore, Anders Nyrén was Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer from 
1992 to 1996 of Securum, a so called bad bank for winding up credit losses, during the worst 
financial crisis which so far has hit the Swedish banking sector. Mr. Nyrén thus has a deep 
knowledge of Swedish finance and has given excellent background information to my 
bachelor thesis. 
Erik Röjvall is a leading financial analyst at Industrivärden and has a thorough knowledge of 
Handelsbanken and the current and future regulations in the financial sector. Mr. Röjvall has 
also granted me an interview, which has resulted in an even deeper understanding of the 
concept of risk in the financial sector. 
Svarte, Ystad, May 2013 
 
Christer Bartholdi 
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Summary 
Banks are normally heavily indebted with equity levels of 5-10 percent of total assets or even 
lower. The assets consist mainly of short-term and long-term loans, funded by deposits which 
can be withdrawn at short notice. In order to avoid excessive withdrawals, which is called a 
bank run, deposit insurance systems, guaranteed by the state, are generally in operation. 
The financial sector is characterized by a high degree of interrelation, as the liabilities of one 
bank are the assets of other banks. To prevent uncontrollable domino effects when financial 
crises occur the central bank will have to step in as lender of last resort.  
A financial crisis generally happens when the economy is out of balance and a financial 
bubble is created by a rapid increase of asset prices. The economic indicator which signals a 
bubble is normally credit expansion far in excess of the growth of the economy 
The Swedish banking crisis of the early 1990s was caused by regulations which meant that 
credits were not directed to the most profitable investments. When the regulations were 
abolished in mid-1980s there was a major expansion of credits and a surge in property prices 
followed by a crash. The credit losses increased from 1 percent of total lending in 1990 to 8 
percent in 1992. The state had to intervene to save the banking sector. The Bank support 
board was created to manage contingency loans and issuing guarantees. Nordbanken was 
temporarily taken over by the state and divided into a “good bank” and a “bad bank”. S-E-
Banken applied for support but subsequently withdrew its application. Handelsbanken was the 
only major bank which did not apply for support. 
The international financial crisis of the 2000s hit the Swedish banks relatively mildly but the 
authorities reacted quickly and guaranteed a total of some 3,500 billion SEK. However, S-E-
Banken and Swedbank totally dominated the Baltic banking sector which experienced a 
classical bubble with a five-fold increase of property prices followed by a sharp fall. The two 
banks suffered heavy losses and had to issue new equity capital in 2008-2009. 
The Swedish state was heavily involved in the crisis of the 1990s when the existence of both 
Nordbanken and Swedbank was threatened. The crisis of the 2000s required far-reaching 
guarantees but no direct involvement as the banks were strong enough to handle the situation. 
My hypothesis is that low risk pays in the long run in Swedish the banking sector. In order to 
test the hypothesis a comparison has been made for the two banks which suffered least from 
the financial crisis of the 1990s and the 2000s, namely Handelsbanken and S-E-Banken.     
Handelsbanken, which has a historically low risk tolerance, has a decentralized organization, 
has made relatively few large acquisitions, is expanding organically abroad, has a credit 
policy based on responsibility by the local branch office and basically accepts a risk position 
only for customer related business. 
S-E-Banken has a centralized organization, has made several aggressive acquisitions followed 
by divestments, has a credit policy based on a scoring system and even evaluates its risk 
position based on the “risk appetite” of the board. 
The statistics for the period 1982 – 2012 clearly speaks in favour of Handelsbanken both in 
regard of credit loss ratio, return on shareholders´equity, dividend in relation to equity and 
Basel II primary capital ratio. Also, Handelsbanken has issued far less new equity capital than 
S-E-Banken over the last thirty years. The hypothesis of this paper is thus verified. 
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1. Background 
1.1 Why banking is such a risky business 
Normally an industrial company operates with an equity ratio of some 20 -30 percent of total 
assets. An equity ratio below 10 percent for an industrial company would be regarded as risky 
from a creditor´s point of view. 
In the early 19th century many banks were partnerships with unlimited liability which meant 
that bank owners had to pay depositors from the bank´s assets or from their own assets 
(Admati & Helwig p. 30). Equity levels of 40-50 percent were fairly normal. Bankers avoided 
to take on too much risk as they were personally liable for the debts of the bank.  
Since the middle of the 19th century limited liability has been the general trend in the banking 
sector. Equity levels have decreased successively from some 25 percent in the early 20th 
century to 6-8 percent of total assets in the United States in the late 20th century and even less 
in most European countries (Admati & Helwig 2013: p. 31). Furthermore banks can borrow 
off the balance sheet or through derivatives. Banks are thus heavily indebted and are very 
sensitive to the value of their assets which mainly consist of short-term and long-term loans. 
Loans are generally funded by deposits, which can be withdrawn at short notice, whereas the 
loans can extend over several years. There is thus an imbedded risk as long-term assets are 
funded by short-term liabilities. Normally withdrawals and deposits roughly balance each 
other. The bank will, however, get into trouble if many depositors are worried about the 
bank´s solvency and want to withdraw their deposits. This is called a bank run. Such runs 
often occurred during the Great Depression in the United States which led to federally 
guaranteed deposit insurance system (Admati & Helwig p. 53). After the financial crisis of 
2007 – 2009 guaranteed deposit insurance systems have also been introduced in Europe. 
The financial sector is characterized by a high degree of interrelation. If a major bank goes 
bankrupt it will affect effect many other financial institutions as the liabilities of one bank 
often are the assets of other banks. This phenomenon is called financial contagion. To prevent 
an uncontrollable domino effect, central banks then will have to step in as lenders of last 
resort to provide the banking system with cash. The alternative to sell assets in order to 
strengthen the balance sheet is normally worse as prices of the assets tend to fall in a state of 
general uncertainty in an economy. 
So why are banks generally so short on equity? Banks with more equity are basically better 
placed to make loans to creditworthy businesses and individuals. The more equity a bank has 
the lower the required return on equity will be and the lower the risk for the bank.  
Admati & Helwig recommend banks to have an equity ratio of 20 – 30 percent, which is the 
normal ratio for industrial companies.  
In a review of Admati & Hellwig in Financial Times issue of March 18, 2013, the well-known 
British journalist Martin Wolf summarizes that banks today are “so grossly complex and so 
undercapitalized”. 
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1.2 Why do financial crises happen? 
According to classical economic theory there are three factors of production: labour, land and 
capital. Financial risks are generally associated with capital. The reason to take financial risks 
is that it provides a possibility to make a profit – otherwise there is no reason to take a risk. In 
addition the positive value of the possibilities which are associated with a certain capital 
ought to be bigger than the negative value of the risk associated with the capital. However, if 
the value of the risk exceeds the value of the possibilities the situation is out of balance. If this 
is the case not only in a single case for a person or a company but is generally prevailing in 
the economy the situation will sooner or later lead to a financial crisis.   
A financial crisis generally occurs when the economy is out of balance, a situation which can 
be built up over a long period of seemingly stable conditions and then suddenly erupt in a 
financial crisis. In order for the economy of a country to be in balance certain criteria should 
be fulfilled in respect of employment, growth and inflation. These criteria vary from time to 
time. Also assets prices should not increase more than the economic growth in the long run. In 
reality few economies fulfill these criteria at the same time. Thus imbalances have a tendency 
to build up over an extended period of time, as when credit for investment in real property has 
expanded too much. A so called financial bubble has been created, which will normally burst 
when the situation is totally out of balance. A financial crisis has occurred. The crisis can be 
extended in time if corrective measures are not enough or are established too late. 
Lybeck (1992) argues that financial risks could be classified as (1) credit risks, (2) market 
risks, (3) liquidity risks or (4) counter party risks (p. 11).  
The essential definition of a financial crisis as stated by the International Monetary Fund in 
1991 is “a sharp reduction in the value of bank assets, resulting in the apparent or real 
insolvency of many banks and accompanied by some bank collapses and possibly some runs” 
(Lybeck p. 17). The most important triggers of a financial crisis are (1) a recession in 
combination with a general price decrease, (2) contraction in monetary and financial politics 
especially in combination with exorbitant real interest rates and (3) deregulation of financial 
markets and introduction of financial innovations (p. 20). 
Östrup et al (2009) argue that a financial crisis is caused by failures of legal, political and 
regulatory institutions (p. 178). The authors point out that an event must spread through the 
financial system in order to be regarded as a financial crisis. Furthermore the crisis must have 
real consequences by causing for example a credit crunch.  
The four major Nordic countries all experienced a severe financial crisis during a period from 
the mid-1980s to the early 1990s. The crises were characterized by a major lending spree 
from banks and other financial institutions. Real estate values, especially of commercial 
properties, later fell heavily which triggered the crises (Östrup et al p. 185-186). The apparent 
safety of commercial property as collateral tempted banks to increase lending to real property 
(p. 187). This was the case especially in Sweden where prices of office buildings in the 
Stockholm area increased fourfold in real terms during the 1980s (p. 204). 
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A fall in real property prices is much more likely to cause a financial crisis than a fall in 
equity prices because real estate investments are normally highly leveraged which is not the 
case for equity investments (Östrup et al p. 190). 
Cooper (2008) points out that markets are not always efficient but could be rather unstable on 
the contrary. Minsky´s instability hypothesis says that financial markets can generate their 
own forces which will cause credit expansion and asset inflation which will be followed by 
credit contraction and asset deflation (p. 13). A central bank is necessary in order to stabilize 
the economy (p. 37). Financial instability thus caused the need for central banking. 
 There is a fundamental difference between markets of goods and services on one hand and 
asset and credit markets on the other hand. In the goods market higher prices trigger lower 
demand, whereas in the asset market higher prices trigger higher demand and vice versa 
(Cooper p. 101).  
If investors do not have the necessary information to calculate the correct price of an asset 
then asset price bubbles could form without investors behaving irrationally (Cooper p. 112).  
Credit rating agencies base their assessment of credit worthiness on the fact that debt grows in 
proportion to the valuation of the assets. As an asset bubble expands therefore debts never 
look excessive. The false impression is that balance sheets are improved whereas the leverage 
is dependent on rising asset prices. When asset prices begin falling debt will quickly be 
excessive (Cooper p. 114-115). 
The economic indicator which signals a bubble is normally credit expansion. If debt is 
growing much faster than the economy or the income needed to service the debt is exorbitant 
then there is a probability that lenders will tighten their standards. Credit expansion is thus the 
most important macroeconomic variable to observe (Cooper p. 124-125). 
1.3 Why do banks need a central bank? 
Already during the 19th century the British economists Henry Thornton and Walter Bagehot 
pointed out the need of a central bank as a lender of last resort for banks in distress. The 
functions of the central bank would be to (1) protect the money stock, (2) support the whole 
financial system, (3) to enforce stable money growth and (4) to announce its policy in 
advance of crises so as to remove uncertainty from the market (Freixas et al, p. 63). Bagehot 
suggested that in a liquidity crisis a central bank should lend freely with relaxed collateral 
standard. Basically lending by the central bank should be restricted to solvent banks. 
A solvent bank may be vulnerable to deposit withdrawals or the drying up of interbank 
lending in time of crises. The failure of a solvent bank would endanger the stability of the 
financial system. These are the two basic reasons for the central bank to provide liquidity to 
the market. Normally support should be provided to the whole market (Freixas et al, p. 79).  
However, moral hazard could arise if banks expect a “bail-out” in any crisis. Therefore a 
certain degree of uncertainty must prevail as to which institutions will receive support.  
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1.4 The Swedish banking crisis in the early 1990s 
1.4.1 Deregulation of the credit market in the late 1980s 
The Swedish banking sector had been heavily regulated ever since the end of the Second 
World War until the mid-1980s when deregulation became necessary. The regulations were 
the basis for the fixed exchange rate policy which was generally prevailing in Europe within 
the Bretton Woods system which was in force until the early 1970s. Furthermore the Swedish 
house building market was heavily subsidized which made credit regulations necessary.  
Åsbrink (included in Sandberg, 2005: p. 75) states that the regulations meant that credits were 
not directed to the most profitable investments, which was the major flaw of the regulations. 
The banks were in fact obliged to invest in bonds issued by the state and were therefore not 
used to make qualified evaluations of the credit risk. The lack of such competence would later 
lead to excessive bank lending when the regulations were cancelled. 
During the years before the final deregulation decision in 1985 several steps were taken in 
order to soften the credit regulations. Liquidity ratios were lifted in 1983 and interest ceilings 
were lifted in the spring of 1985. Finally the lending ceilings and the placement requirements 
for insurance companies were abolished in November 1985, the so called November 
revolution. The Riksbank raised cash reserve requirements for banks from 1 to 3 percent but 
monetary and fiscal policies were not changed in any other way (Englund p. 83-84). A new 
era of free competition had now been established in the Swedish credit market. 
After the deregulation was carried out criticism has been made on several points, the most 
important of which are: (1) The credit expansion was much bigger than could be expected, but 
in fact this did not take place until 1987 and (2) The tax reform of 1991, which basically made 
interest deductions less interesting, and the liberalization of the foreign exchange regulation 
were made in the wrong order. Åsbrink (Sandberg p. 81- 85) means that this is a theoretical ex 
ante idea, based on known facts. From a practical point of view there were few alternatives in 
which order to carry out the reforms. 
Åsbrink (Sandberg p. 102 - 103) summarizes that the deregulation of the credit market led to 
an expansion which was far in excess of what had been anticipated. The credit expansion led 
to a surge in Swedish property prices in the late 1980s which subsequently was followed by a 
major crash in the finance and property markets. However, the credit regulations were 
anyhow totally outdated and could not be sustained in an international market. 
1.4.2 Credit expansion in 1986 – 1990 
Over the five-year period 1986 – 1990 total lending increased by 136 percent. Lending from 
banks increased by 174 percent and from mortgage institutions by 167 percent (Englund p. 
84). Banks could now enter into markets which had previously not been allowed. This meant 
that finance companies were pushed into more risky markets. However, finance companies 
were directly and indirectly financed by the banks, so that the banks became indirectly 
exposed to extra credit risk (Englund 1999: p. 85). 
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Pettersson (1993: p. 28-29) states that the Swedish economy because of the credit expansion 
became overheated in the late 1980s, especially in the construction market, with building 
price index far exceeding the consumer price index, the real property market, with an increase 
of 140 percent for commercial properties and 100 percent for family houses during 1985-1990 
and the labour market with unemployment reaching an all-time low of 1.4 percent in 1989.  
Englund points out that deregulation, although being important, was not the only factor that 
led to the financial crisis. The possibility of generous lending combined with insufficient risk 
analysis gave way to a price boom (p. 89).  
1.4.3 The financial crisis in the early 1990s 
It is a well-known fact that the bankruptcy of Finans AB Nyckeln in September 1990 is 
regarded as the trigger of the financial crisis although it was only a sign of the unhealthy 
market conditions. The industrial production had culminated already in mid-1990 and 
property prices had started to fall (Larsson & Sjögren 1995: p. 133).  
In 1991 it became fully evident that the banking sector was in for a major crisis when another 
finance company, Gamlestaden, went bankrupt with debts to Nordbanken of some 11.5 billion 
SEK (Larsson & Sjögren p. 137).  
Total credit losses for the commercial banks increased from 1.1 percent of lending in 1990 to 
7.6 percent of lending in 1992 until a gradual decline began in 1993 with credit losses of 6.5 
percent of lending (Larsson & Sjögren p. 138). Of the major banks Nordbanken and Gota 
Bank suffered the most with credit losses in 1992 of 18.8 percent and 11.3 percent of lending, 
respectively. Svenska Handelsbanken and S-E-Banken were far better off with credit losses 
culminating in 1993 of 4.7 percent and 5.9 percent of lending, respectively (Larsson & 
Sjögren p. 141).  
The Swedish state had to intervene in order to save the banking sector, which was in a deep 
crisis. In the autumn of 1992 the state issued a guarantee for all bank obligations, except 
equity. A Bank support board was created to manage applications for bank support, such as 
contingency loans, guarantees when issuing new capital and direct capital infusions. A major 
bank, Nordbanken, was divided into a “good bank” and a “bad bank” called Securum. Both 
banks received capital from the state and became temporarily owned by the state. One of the 
minor banks, Gota, was also recapitalized, then taken over by the state for one krona and 
subsequently merged with Nordbanken (Östrup et al 2009: p. 205). 
Nordbanken received a total of 60 billion SEK for assets booked at 67 billion SEK. At the end 
of 1993 this value had been written down to 33 billion SEK meaning that the excess valuation 
of assets transferred to Securum was some 30-35 billion SEK. Without the capital injection 
Nordbanken would not have survived (Östrup et al p. 208). Please refer to enclosure A for a 
detailed description of how Securum was established and worked. 
Handelsbanken was the only bank which did not apply for support from the state. S-E-Banken 
applied but subsequently withdrew its application after market conditions improved when 
Sweden left the fixed rate regime and let the krona float freely in late 1992. 
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1.4.4 Credit losses in the banking sector 
Wallander (1994) has made a thorough investigation of credit losses in the banking sector 
during 1990 – 1993, as a public enquiry on behalf of the Finance department. 
During the period 1981 – 1989 credit losses in relation to lending were fairly constant at about 
0.5 percent of lending. Then, as a result of the financial crisis, the losses rose to 7 percent of 
lending in 1992 before starting to slowly fall back. Wallander summarizes the losses during 
the four years 1990 – 1993 to 175 billion SEK. The bulk of the losses originated from 
Nordbanken (including Securum), Sparbanken Sverige and GOTA, which together accounted 
for 65 percent of the total losses (Wallander p. 80). 
In relation to lending the losses for the period 1990 - 1993 amounted to 37 percent for GOTA, 
21 percent for Nordbanken and 18 percent for Sparbanken Sverige. The two “healthy” banks 
Handelsbanken and S-E-Banken had considerably lower losses of 10 percent and 12 percent.  
Total credit losses referring to companies amounted to 70 percent of all losses of which two 
thirds were “property related” (p. 140). It is striking that “property related” losses were far 
higher in GOTA and Nordbanken than in Handelsbanken and S-E-Banken (p. 90). It is also 
worth noting that credit expansion was far higher in Gota and Nordbanken during 1980 – 
1989 than in Handelsbanken and S-E-Banken (p. 141).  
Wallander summarizes his investigation by stating what should be learnt from the crisis. Bank 
management as well as the board and auditors are responsible for credit valuation and 
assessment. The government is responsible for issuing proper regulations on the capital 
needed for banks. The authorities are responsible for strictly and continuously monitoring 
bank activities (p. 143 – 145). 
1.4.5 How serious was the crisis of the 1990s? 
The final bill to the tax payers for saving the financial sector is calculated by Jennergren and 
Näslund to 35 billion SEK or 2 percent of GDP.  
Hagberg and Jonung (2000) have made an extensive comparison of all the major crises which 
Sweden has suffered from 1870 to 2000, including the two world wars, the deflation crisis of 
the 1920s and the world crisis of the 1930s, the two oil crises in the 1970s and the 1990s 
crisis. The authors have estimated the costs of the crises as loss of real income, loss of 
industrial output and loss of employment (p. 35). 
The 1990s crisis is a clear example of a boom-bust cycle, with a fairly high economic loss. 
Especially the loss of employment of 17 percentage points between 1990 and 1994 was 
devastating (p. 40) and led to a sharp fall for Sweden in the international comparison of GDP 
per capita. Also the loss in real income was exceptional which was only exceeded by the crisis 
of the 1930s (p. 43). Sweden lost its international top position as regards GDP per capita. 
Hagberg and Jonung summarize that the crisis of the 1990s meant a change from negative real 
interest rates to positive real interest rates. This led to a decrease of the demand for credit. 
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1.5 The Swedish banking crisis in the late 2000s 
The financial crisis of 2008 was a global financial crisis which affected most of the world 
from mid-2008, basically because of an overvalued and over-indebted real property market in 
the US. Also in Europe real property was heavily overvalued in many countries after a period 
of strong credit expansion. The financial crisis led to an extended recession both in the US 
and Europe. 
The American real property bubble emanated from a series of decisions during the years 1997 
- 2004 in order to stimulate the housing market. The state-owned institutions for housing 
financing were obliged to provide at least half of the housing credits to persons with income 
below the median, including true low income earners. These loans with insufficient collateral 
are called sub-prime loans.  
When the interest level successively increased in the US during 2002 – 2007 housing became 
more expensive. The increased risk level in the financial sector caused a substantial increase 
of interest rates between the banks. The situation led to several mergers and acquisitions in 
the banking sector during 2008. The bankruptcy in September 2008 of the investment bank 
Lehman Brothers, which had invested heavily in sub-prime loans, triggered a general crisis in 
the American real property market. Many European banks had also invested in the American 
housing market via securitized assets like Mortgage Backed Securities and Collateralized 
Debt Obligations. 
The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers led to general lack of confidence between the financial 
institutions and the international interbank funding market more or less vanished. The 
authorities of all the major economies therefore had to enforce programs in order to stabilize 
the situation.  
Bergström (2009) summarizes the decisions made by the Swedish government in October 
2008 in order to stabilize the financial market: (1) a voluntary guarantee program in order to 
support financing of solvent financial institutions, (2) a program to support banks in crisis and 
(3) a stability fund aimed at solving future insolvencies in financial institutions. Furthermore a 
deposit insurance system up to originally 1 million SEK was guaranteed by the state.  
The guarantee program was only used by Swedbank and some minor financial institutions. A 
solvent bank in distress could be entitled to a capital support of a maximum of SEK 50 billion 
in order to strengthen the capital base and improve the lending capacity.  The state contributed 
15 billion SEK to the stability fund. The major financial institutions are obliged to pay an 
annual fee to the stability fund (Bergström p. 15-16 and 27-28). 
The major Swedish banks reacted quickly to the crisis and issued new equity capital in 2008 
of which Swedbank 14 billion SEK, S-E-Banken 15 billion SEK and Nordea 30 billion SEK. 
Handelsbanken was the only major Swedish bank which did not issue new equity capital. 
The Swedish state guaranteed a total of some 3,500 billion SEK, in fact more than the gross 
domestic product, the main items of which were deposit insurance of 1,000 billion SEK, the 
guarantee program of 1,500 billion SEK and export guarantees of 900 billion SEK. 
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1.5.1 Analysis of the financial market turmoil by Riksbank Govenors 
Several of the Governors of the Swedish Riksbank have analyzed the causes and 
consequences of the financial crisis of the late 2000s as well as how to improve the 
authorities´ management as well as monetary policy in a financial crisis. 
Nyberg et al (2008: p. 38-46) discuss securitization of credits, that is issuing bonds backed by 
mortgages and credit cards. Originally this was a straight forward procedure, but eventually 
the bonds were repackaged in so called structured credit instruments like collateralized debt 
obligations. The credit risks were hidden and pricing became difficult. Financing was referred 
back to the bank, like with the finance companies in the Swedish financial crisis of the 1990s. 
When credit assessments deteriorated in the US, first hedge funds and then the US banks were 
affected. However, the Swedish banks had only very marginally invested in securitized assets. 
Molin and Ingves (2009) discuss how authorities shall manage crises in the financial system. 
They point to repacking of subprime loans, which caused extremely complicated structures. It 
was impossible to know the extent of sub-prime loans and therefore the international 
interbank market dried up. The authors find many similarities to the international financial 
crisis of the late 2000s and the Swedish crisis of the early 1990s, with a “grey” credit market 
(p. 10). 
Molin and Ingves further stress that regulations must be enforced to give the state the right 
tools in a financial crisis. The internationalization of the Swedish banks, which have more 
than half of their assets abroad, requires cross-border cooperation (p. 18). The regulations 
should (1) ensure resolute actions when needed, (2) ensure quick and easy pay of the deposit 
guarantee and (3) give the state sufficient power towards bank shareholders (p. 20-21). 
1.5.2 Credit losses suffered by S-E-Banken and Swedbank in the Baltic countries 2005 – 2009 
Johansson et al (2010) have analyzed the economic development of the Baltic countries 
during the late 2000s, the local performance of S-E-Banken and Swedbank as well as the 
credit losses suffered by the banks during the financial crisis. 
After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 the Baltic countries gained independence and 
established capitalist economies. In 2004 the three countries joined the European Union. The 
currencies were pegged to the euro. Both Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania enjoyed high 
economic growth during the 2000s up to the financial crisis. The economic growth was, 
however, based more on consumption financed by loans than on real investments. Property 
prices increased fivefold during 2001 – 2006 (p. 39). The bubble erupted in 2007 and the 
prices continued to fall in 2008. In 2009 prices fell even more. 
S-E-Banken and Swedbank were the major banks in the Baltic countries. The banks increased 
their lending heavily, S-E-Banken by more than 120 percent from 2005 to 2008 and 
Swedbank more than five-fold during the same period. Many loans were issued in euros. 
When the financial crisis erupted credit losses became very large in the Baltic countries. S-E-
Banken took credit losses of 1.3 percent of lending in 2008 and 5.4 percent in 2009 (p. 21).  
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The credit losses for Swedbank amounted to 0.9 percent of lending in 2008 and 6.6 percent in 
2009 (p. 32). 
Both banks had to issue new equity capital in order to improve their solvency.  
S-E-Banken gave no dividend for 2008 and made an issue of new share capital in early 2009 
of 15 billion SEK in order to reach a primary capital ratio of 14 percent at the end of 2009. 
Swedbank had to issue new share capital both in 2008 and 2009 with a total of 28 billion SEK 
in order to reach a primary capital ratio of 14 percent at the end of 2009. 
Johansson et al conclude that lending to the Baltic public was focused on new housing and 
general consumption. All the Baltic countries had major deficits in their current accounts, 
which indicates that borrowed foreign money was used for consumption which in the end 
created a financial bubble (p. 56). 
1.5.3 A comparison between the crisis in Asia and the crisis in the Baltic countries 
Bernhardtsson and Billborn (2010) have made a comparison of the financial crises in Asia in 
the late 1990s and in the Baltic countries in the late 2000s. The authors point out that there are 
obvious similarities between the regions insofar that both went from regulated economies to 
market economies. Both regions suffered economic crises after a period of high growth and 
dramatic increase in property prices fueled by strong credit expansion (p. 5). 
Growth in the Baltics accelerated when the three countries joined the European Union in 2004 
and tied their currencies to the euro. There was a rapid increase in the flow of foreign capital. 
Domestic consumption increased rapidly and new investment in housing soared (p. 7). The 
bonanza was financed by large deficits in the current account, which were the largest in 
Europe (p. 8). Lending to households and companies increased rapidly, with real interest rates 
being negative. 
The banks began restricting their lending in 2007. When the global recession occurred in 2009 
the Baltic countries were severely hit, with a GDP decrease of 14 – 18 percent. Property 
prices plummeted with a decrease over two years of between 50 and 70 percent. (p. 15).  
Instead of devaluing their currencies the governments of all three Baltic countries chose an 
internal devaluation, that is a reduction of wages and public expenditures (p. 15).  
The two Swedish banks S-E-Banken and Swedbank totally dominated the Baltic banking 
sector. Lending was financed by borrowing euros on the international capital market at low 
interest (p. 19). In the end the two banks suffered considerable credit losses and had to issue 
new equity capital as detailed by Johansson et al. Please refer to section 1.5.2 above. 
The similarities between the Asian crisis in the late 1990s and the Baltic crisis ten years later 
is that foreign capital was invested in non-tradables. The fixed exchange rates generated 
unrealistic confidence in the currencies. The foreign banks probably contributed to the severe 
imbalances in the Baltic countries (p. 20). 
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1.6 Comparison of how the Swedish banking crises were solved in the 1990s and the 2000s 
Both the crisis of the early 1990s and the late 2000s erupted suddenly and with great impact, 
although there had been signs well before of strong credit expansion and fast rising property 
prices. The 1990s crisis was an isolated Swedish/Scandinavian phenomenon whereas the 
2000s crisis was truly international and quickly spread from America to Europe. 
The Swedish authorities reacted quickly in both cases and supported the financial system in 
order to prevent bank runs and bank failures. The Bank support board of the 1990s strictly 
adhered to the idea of avoiding bail-out of bank shareholders. Only a minor part of the state 
support went to the private shareholders of Nordbanken, whereas the shareholders of GOTA 
received no compensation. The split-up of Nordbanken and GOTA in a “good bank” and a 
“bad bank” was well carried out. The state provided support to Nordbanken of some 35 
billion SEK or some 2 percent of GDP but in the end probably most of the support was 
covered in various ways. Please refer to enclosure A.  
Handelsbanken and S-E-Banken both issued new capital in 1993 in order to strengthen their 
capital base after they had suffered heavy credit losses during 1990-1993 of 10 and 12 
percent, respectively, of their lending. 
Generally the winding-up of the banking crisis of the 1990s has been regarded as very 
successful and has been seen as an international example of how to handle a banking crisis. 
However, it has also been pointed out that the expensive defense of the fixed exchange rate 
during 1992 meant that the crisis was unnecessarily extended.  
In the autumn of 2008 the American and European governments had to act quickly in order to 
stabilize the financial sector. The Swedish state provided considerable guarantees for the 
financial sector including a deposit insurance scheme, a guarantee program and export 
guarantees, in fact totaling more than the gross domestic product. 
The Swedish domestic banking market was not affected in the 2000s by the international 
financial crisis as property values did not fall and the bank did not register any exceptional 
credit losses. However, the internationalization of the Swedish banks gave rise to considerable 
credit losses for S-E-Banken and Swedbank in the Baltic countries where the two Swedish 
banks totally dominated the market. The Baltics had experienced a classic financial bubble 
during the mid-2000s with property prices first increasing fivefold and then plummeting more 
than 50 percent over two years, which caused S-E-Banken and Swedbank major credit losses. 
The major Swedish banks issued new equity capital in 2008 except for Handelsbanken. 
Swedbank had to issue equity capital also in 2009. 
When comparing how the crises of the 1990s and the 2000s were solved it is striking that the 
state was much more heavily involved in the 1990s when the existence of both Nordbanken 
and Sparbanken were threatened. The state managed well without too costly bail-outs. 
The crisis of the 2000s required wide-reaching guarantees from the state but no direct 
involvement as the banks were strong enough to handle the situation by themselves. 
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2. Problem 
The Background section of this paper describes how the banking crises of the early 1990s and 
the late 2000s developed. Of the four major Swedish banks only Handelsbanken and S-E- 
Banken survived the crises without public support. 
Nordbanken suffered heavy losses in the early 1990s and was temporarily taken over by the 
Swedish state. The bank was split into a “bad bank” called Securum, which was wound up in 
the mid-1990s, and a “good bank”. After privatization Nordbanken subsequently developed 
into a major Scandinavian bank called Nordea after mergers with Merita Bank in Finland, Uni 
Bank in Denmark and several Norwegian banks. 
Sparbanken also suffered heavily in the crisis of the 1990s and received guarantees from the 
state in order to carry on its business. After several mergers with other savings banks 
Swedbank was formed. The bank ventured into the Baltics and Ukraine in the early 2000s and 
suffered heavy losses when the local economies collapsed after a property bubble was 
pricked. Swedbank only survived because of several issues of equity capital. 
S-E-Banken made severe losses in the early 1990s and applied for assistance from the state 
but withdrew its application after the economy improved when Sweden let the krona float 
freely in late 1992. In the 2000s the bank invested heavily abroad with acquisitions of 
subsidiaries in the Baltic countries, Germany and Ukraine. S-E-Banken also made heavy 
losses in the Baltics and had to issue equity capital in order to improve the capital base. 
Handelsbanken made losses in the early 1990s but to a much lesser extent than the other 
banks. The bank is generally characterized by a low risk profile. Expansion is normally made 
gradually by setting up new branches in new markets outside Sweden. There have been 
relatively few acquisitions of other banks. Handelsbanken never ventured into Eastern Europe 
and was therefore not much affected by the banking crisis of the 2000s.  
Based on the extensive background description and the problem outlined above I have 
established a hypothesis, namely that low risk can pay in the long run in the Swedish 
banking sector. In order to verify or nullify the hypothesis a comparison will be made 
between Handelsbanken, which has suffered least during the banking crisis of the 1990s and 
the 2000s, and S-E-Banken, which suffered badly but survived without assistance from the 
state. The two other major banks, Nordea and Swedbank, received direct and indirect support 
from the state and have also a quite different structure today as compared to the early 1990s. 
3. Purpose 
The purpose of this paper is to verify or nullify the hypothesis that low risk can pay in the 
long run in the Swedish banking sector. 
4. Limitation of the problem 
The study is limited to a comparison of Handelsbanken and S-E-Banken over the last thirty 
years 1982 – 2012 for which official reports were easily available in the library. 
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5. Methodology and theory 
The methodology of this paper is to describe the background to the problem by making a 
thorough literature study of banking in general, why financial crises happen and to separately 
describe the crises of the 1990s and the 2000s. Only sources which have been used for this 
paper are listed as references. 
Primary data consist of selecting certain quantitative items from the annual reports of 
Handelsbanken and S-E-Banken for the thirty year period of 1982 – 2012. The data has been 
scrutinized and is presented in diagrams supported by comments.  
The period of thirty years is largely selected from a practical point of view as annual reports 
for a period of forty or fifty years are not available at the library. However, as the banks have 
not altered their policy since the 1970s a longer period would probably not have changed the 
outcome of the analysis. 
A central theme of providing credit for a bank is how to grant credit facilities and how to 
measure probable loan losses. The description of this process is based on the latest annual 
reports of Handelsbanken and S-E-Banken. 
Finally, semi-structured interviews have been conducted with Anders Nyrén, chairman of 
Handelsbanken and former Chief Financial Officer of Securum, as well as with Erik Röjvall, 
leading financial analyst at Industrivärden. The number of respondents is thus very limited but 
on the other hand the respondents are extremely well informed. 
The interviews were based on a list of questions but the discussions evolved beyond the 
questions. Only short notes were taken during the interviews, which were then elaborated 
upon and presented to the respondents for their approval. 
The reliability and validity of the literature study can be regarded as very high, especially 
regarding the crisis of the 1990s which has been thoroughly described by many authors, both 
when the crisis was acute and in hindsight some 15 – 20 years later. The literature regarding 
the crisis of the 2000s is far less, mainly because of the relative minor importance of the 
crisis. Also too little time has passed for making analysis in hindsight. However, the 
description of the crisis of the 2000s can be regarded as fairly reliable. 
The quantitative accounting data assembled from the annual reports from 1982 to 2012 of 
Handelsbanken and S-E-Banken must be regarded as reliable as they are based on official 
accounting rules and reviewed by auditors. The conclusions based on the data must therefore 
be regarded as valid. 
Finally the interviews should be regarded as additional information from well informed 
people. As both the respondents are part of the “Handelsbanken sphere” the validity is not 
fully sufficient. 
The theoretical background of bank financing, risk levels, capital requirement, risk profile 
and complex legislation is outlined in the interview with Erik Röjvall (p. 31-32). 
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6. The concept of financial risk 
The risk concept of a bank consists of the following five major factors: (1) credit risk, (2) 
market risk, (3) liquidity risk, (4) operational risk and (5) business risk (almost identical 
definitions are stated in Handelsbanken and S-E-Banken annual reports 2012). 
Based on the risk situation of a bank, the economic capital needed to cover all the risks can 
then be calculated. 
 6.1 Credit risk 
Credit risk is defined as the risk that the bank will suffer an economic loss because the 
counterparties of the bank cannot fulfill their obligations (Handelsbanken 2012 p. 84). Credit 
risk in general is the most important risk that a bank is exposed to.  
There are many aspects of credit risk exposure such as lending by country, lending by branch 
of business, lending by credit risk class, counter party risk and payment risk.  
6.2 Market risk 
The market risk emanates from price and volatility changes on the financial markets and is 
further divided into (1) interest risk, (2) share price risk, (3) currency risks and (4) commodity 
price risk. Each of these risks could be measured by a statistical Value at Risk (Handels- 
banken 2012 p. 92). 
6.3 Liquidity risk 
Liquidity risk is the risk that the bank cannot fulfill its payment obligations on the due date 
without obtaining funding at an unacceptable cost (Handelsbanken 2012 p. 96).  
In order for a bank to handle liquidity risk a thorough liquidity planning is necessary on a day 
by day basis, as well as a considerable liquidity reserve. 
6.4 Operational risk 
Operational risk is the risk for losses emanating from improper internal processes, human 
error, faulty systems and external events including legal risk (Handelsbanken 2012 p. 102). 
Banks generally handle operational risks by continuous control and improvement of 
administrative systems. Also plans are made of how to act in a situation of severe crisis. 
6.5 Business risk 
Finally there is a business risk of unexpected change of profitability which cannot be referred 
to any of the risks described above. 
6.6 Economic capital needed to cover the combined risks 
The combined risks of a bank can be summarized as the economic capital which is needed in 
order to cover all risks that the bank is exposed to (Handelsbanken 2012 p. 105). 
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7 Brief history of Handelsbanken 
Bartholdi (2010) has summarized the history of Handelsbanken (p. 164-166). 
Stockholm´s Handelsbank was established in 1871 after a conflict with Stockholm´s Enskilda 
Bank. Some of the board members of Enskilda Banken resigned and formed a new bank 
which came to be known as “the Divorced Bank” (Frånskilda Banken in Swedish). The first 
president of Stockholm´s Handelsbank was Louis Fraenkel who led the new bank from its 
foundation until 1911. Fraenkel put great emphasis on bond and currency transactions and 
was very successful in obtaining good profitability for Stockholm´s Handelsbank, which 
became the number two business bank in Sweden. 
 In 1914 the bank began its expansion outside Stockholm by acquiring Norra Sverige. Further 
expansion took place in 1917 by acquisition of Norrlandsbanken and Södra Sverige in 1919.  
During the financial crisis of the 1920s and 1930s Handelsbanken took over majority 
shareholdings of several major industrial companies, like SCA, Fagersta, Bolinder-Munktell 
and LM Ericsson, which were subsequently transferred to the holding company 
Industrivärden when that company was established in 1944.  
During the 1940s and 1950s a number of provincial banks were acquired. The last acquisition 
of a provincial bank was of Skånska Banken in 1990.  
Handelsbanken suffered a financial crisis in the late 1960s and new management led by Jan 
Wallander took over, who implemented a decentralized organization with a number of 
independent regional banks. Ever since 1972 Handelsbanken has achieved its goal of being 
more profitable than the average of Sweden´s (and subsequently Scandinavia´s) other listed 
banks. A profit-sharing system, called Oktogonen, was introduced in order to encourage 
employee performance, with payment deferred until retirement. The Oktogonen foundation is 
today one of the two major shareholders of Handelsbanken. The other one is Industrivärden. 
The Swedish banking crisis of the early 1990s (please refer to section 1.4 above for a detailed 
description) meant severe credit losses for all the major banks, several of which were given 
support from the state. Handelsbanken was the only bank which did not apply for support. In 
December 1993 Financial Times named Handelsbanken “Clear winner of the crisis”. 
“Handelsbanken suffered much lower losses than its rivals and is the only leading bank … 
which neither received nor sought any form of state assistance” (Handelsbanken 1993: 4). 
Beginning in 1991 expansion abroad was built up by organic growth of subsidiaries in 
Norway, Finland, Denmark, Great Britain and the Netherlands, complemented by minor 
acquisitions. Handelsbanken is today doing business in more than 20 countries. 
Handelsbanken also ventured into the mortgage market by acquiring Stadshypotek in 1997 
and into life insurance by acquisitions of RKA in 1992 and SPP in the 2001. The latter 
company was sold in 2007 with a considerable capital gain.     
Today Handelsbanken is a major universal bank with a complete range of financial services.                                                                                                                             
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8 Credit policy of Handelsbanken 
Handelsbanken´s credit policy is described in detail in the 2012 Annual report p. 84-87. 
The branch office who knows the customer and the market well has the best possibility to 
estimate the risk and can also act at an early stage if problems arise. Each branch office or 
department is responsible to solve any problem. This means that that there will be high risk 
awareness and also a generally careful way of acting in the business activity. 
In addition to the responsibility of the local branch risk control is also carried out by the 
regional banks and within the business areas. This procedure certifies that there will not be 
too much risk in in the local business and that the risk policy of the bank is maintained. 
The central credit and risk departments play an important role in the business model, by 
analyzing major credits before final decision by the board and by verifying that the total risk 
exposure is within the policy of low risk tolerance.  
The bank has a policy of close contact between the customer and the local branch office. The 
office manager and his subordinates are responsible for customer relations and credit 
decisions. Without consent of the local branch manager a credit cannot be further processed in 
the bank. The basic document for a credit decision shall always be produced by the local 
branch office. The documents include financial information about the borrower, an estimate 
of the ability to reimburse the credit plus an evaluation of the collateral. The ability for the 
borrower to reimburse the credit is the very basis of the bank´s decision to lend money. 
On all levels in the bank credit decisions are scrutinized by a superior level. A basic rule is 
that borrowers shall have a high quality. Quality is more important than volume. 
The fact that the branch office has close contact with the customer ensures that problems can 
be identified quickly and action will be taken if needed. This ensures a much faster reaction 
than if problem credits are handled on a central basis. The local branch office shall handle the 
problems arising if payments are not duly made and will also be charged if credit losses arise.  
9 Risk profile of Handelsbanken 
Handelsbanken has a historically low risk tolerance. This means that the bank avoids taking 
part in high risk business, even if the reward momentarily might be very high. The low risk 
tolerance is maintained by a strong risk culture which is prevailing over time and refers to all 
departments of the bank.  
The business model is based on that all credit risks will be taken by the local branches. Other 
risks, like market risks, should therefore be minimized. A risk position will only be taken in 
customer related business and within strictly defined limits (Handelsbanken 2012: 13).  
The strict risk profile means that the bank can be a stable business partner for the customers. 
Thereby a high service level can be maintained also when local markets are under stress. The 
same principles for risk exposure are used in all countries where the bank is doing business 
and are also guidelines in the continued expansion abroad (Handelsbanken 2012: 83). 
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10 Brief history of S-E-Banken 
Karlsson and Nilsson (2006) have summarized the history of Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken 
(SEB 150 years 1856 - 2006). 
S-E-Banken was established in 1972 by a merger of Stockholm´s  Enskilda Bank and the 
Gothenburg based Skandinaviska Banken.  
Stockholm´s Enskilda Bank, which was formed in 1856 by A O Wallenberg, was the first 
private bank in Stockholm. The bank began accepting deposits from the public and soon 
became a major local bank. The Wallenberg family has been in leading positions of the bank 
ever since with several well-known bankers in five generations. 
Skandinaviska Kredit AB was established in Gothenburg in 1864, originally aimed at issuing 
bonds on the international market. It was the first Swedish bank with limited responsibility for 
the owners. The bank was originally led by the Mannheimer family. 
During the 1870s Sweden had favorable business climate with a strong demand of iron ore 
and wood. Investments were made in new railways and industrial plants. The banks 
participated by financing the investments. When the business climate worsened in 1878 
Stockholm´s Enskilda Bank was badly hit and had to be saved by a loan from the Riksbank.  
Skandinaviska Banken participated in several mergers during the early 20th century and 
became a leading Swedish bank. The Wallenberg family, however, kept the local profile of 
Stockholm´s Enskilda Bank and did not participate in any mergers. 
The bankruptcy of the Kreuger Group in the early 1930s was a major blow to Skandinaviska 
Banken as it had been Kreuger´s main financing facility. The bank was saved only by loans 
from the Riksbank. However, the bank recovered fast and continued its expansion by 
acquisitions of several minor banks during the 1940s and 1950s.  
Stockholm´s Enskilda Bank kept its local profile but had now run into problems of how to 
finance its associated companies in the Swedish industry. Through the redemption of pledged 
assets after the Kreuger bankruptcy the bank acquired significant shareholdings of several 
major companies like STAB, LME, SKF and Grängesberg, which were transferred to the 
holding company Investor. 
After extremely secret negotiations during the early 1970s a merger between Stockholm´s 
Enskilda Bank and Skandinaviska Banken was carried out as from 1972. In the beginning the 
two banks more or less kept their former organizations. Not until 1990 a common 
management for the S-E-Banken Group was established.  
Expansion abroad was carried out in the late 1990s by acquisition of banks in the three Baltic 
countries. A German bank was acquired in 2000 and a bank in Ukraine in 2004. The banks in 
Germany and Ukraine have subsequently been divested, but lending to companies remains. 
In 2001 a merger with Swedbank (formerly Föreningssparbanken) was announced but was 
stopped by the EU commission, which demanded major concessions. 
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11 Credit policy of S-E-Banken 
S-E-Banken´s credit policy is described in detail in the 2012 Annual report p. 42-44. 
The credit portfolio is split into five segments: companies, households, commercial 
properties, banks and the public sector. Company credit comprises 41 percent of the total 
credit portfolio and is by far the largest segment. The companies are major Scandinavian and 
German ones. The most important branches are manufacturing industry and business related 
services. 
The credit policy of S-E-Banken is built upon the principle that all granting of credits shall be 
based on analysis and be in proportion to the customer´s cash flow and payment ability.  
Credit granting shall be based on the credit worthiness of the customer and the type of credit 
contract. The current transaction as well as the total credit volume granted to the customer 
shall be considered. The process varies depending on the type of customer and the credit 
amount. The credit procedure for households and minor companies is made by a scoring 
system. Qualified credit analysis is made primarily for major companies. 
A credit risk is assessed by measuring the probability of default, exposure at default, maturity 
and loss given default, which is in line with the Basel requirements (please see section 13). 
S-E-Banken has an internal system of measuring the probability of default, which is graded 
into 16 risk classes, where class 1 is the lowest risk of default and class 16 represents default. 
The system is based on more than 15 years of internal statistics. The assessment of risk class 
is based on analysis of the risk of the customer´s business and the financial position.  
For each individual customer a limit is established for the risk which the bank is willing to 
accept. The total credit portfolio is continuously analyzed from various angles, such as branch 
of business, geography, risk class, product, size etc. Special stress tests are also performed, 
when market conditions indicate such a need. 
12 Risk profile of S-E-Banken 
The bank uses well tested methods for risk handling. Since many years there are independent 
functions for risk control, credit analysis and credit granting based on advanced internal 
models. The basis for the risk and capital handling system is a clear decision order, high 
awareness of risk by the employees, common definitions and principles, control of risk taking 
combined with a high level of transparency in the external reporting (S-E-Banken 2011: 39). 
Based on general goals, strategy and risk appetite plus external factors such as 
macroeconomic conditions, demands by the authorities and market expectations a group 
business plan is compiled annually. The plan comprises an analysis of the risk profile 
combined with financing, liquidity and capital needs. An important part of the business plan is 
the risk strategy which describes how the risk profile changes as a result of the business plan 
which evaluates the risk profile in relation to the risk appetite of the board. The risk strategy is 
decided by the board (S-E-Banken 2011: 38).  
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13 Risk regulation according to “Basel” rules 
The so called Basel regulations are based on a document published by the Basel Committee in 
1987, with the purpose to unify measurement of capital adequacy for international banks. The 
first set of rules called Basel I covered only capital measurement into first tier and second tier 
capital, risk weights associated to various risk classes and a capital adequacy rule defined as a 
minimum of 8 percent of capital in relation to risk weighted assets (Danila 2012: p. 123). 
Basel I was not adopted to the rapid development of the financial markets in the subsequent 
years and a new set of rules called Basel II were introduced in 2006. Basel II is based on three 
pillars of minimum capital requirement, prudential supervision process and market discipline. 
As compared to Basel I the novelties are (1) operational risk was treated separately and not 
included in the credit risk, (2) several methods were introduced to assess the capital 
requirements, of which the banks could choose the one best suited to their needs and (3) a 
strong connection between capital adequacy, supervision by the authorities and market 
discipline (Danila p. 124).  
The first pillar divides the minimum of risk weighted assets into credit risk, market risk and 
operational risk, with optional methods proposed for the various risks. The second pillar deals 
with internal control and supervision of the risks and exposures. At the same time the 
authorities are obliged to scrutinize the control procedures. The third pillar deals with the 
information and transparency the bank regularly gives to the market (Cavalli-Abrahamsson et 
al 2009: p. 14-16). 
Danila points out that Basel II has had a negative impact by significantly reducing capital 
requirements for banks which have used internal models not correlated to their ability to 
withstand a financial crisis (p. 130). This was revealed during the financial crisis of 2007 – 
2009 which revealed lax regulation for certain non-banking institutions and non-traditional 
banking activities (Delimatsis 2012: p. 1314). An improvement of the rules has therefore 
become necessary in order to improve financial stability (Danila p. 131). 
Basel III regulations, which will not fully come into force until 2019, will increase the capital 
requirement of equity and other financial instruments from 4 percent to 6 percent. In addition 
to the minimum capital ratio of 8.0 percent of risk weighted assets, a capital conservation 
buffer of 2.5 percent as well as a countercyclical capital buffer of another 0 - 2.5 per cent will 
be introduced. The minimum loss absorption requirement is thus 10.5 to 13.0 percent of risk 
weighted assets. 
The total primary capital demand will be a minimum of 7.0 percent, which can be increased 
by local authorities to 9.5 percent of risk weighed assets. 
Admati and Helwig (2013) point out that even with Basel III rules banks can easily “game the 
regulation” (p. 96). Also a too low level of equity is still permitted. The risk models and stress 
tests can easily be manipulated (p. 170). Furthermore the minimum equity level is still based 
on risk-weighted assets, not total assets. An equity ratio of 10-15 percent of risk-weighted 
assets might correspond to as low as 2-3 percent of total assets (p. 176). 
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14 Financial comparison of Handelsbanken and S-E-Banken during 1982 – 2012 
Based on the official Annual reports of Handelsbanken and S-E-Banken for the thirty-year 
period 1982 – 2012 a financial comparison has been made in respect of (1) Loan loss ratio, (2) 
Return on shareholders´equity, (3) Dividend in relation to equity, (4) Equity capital ratio and 
(5) Primary capital ratio according to Basel II rules for the five-year period 2008 – 2012. An 
average has been calculated for the periods with equal weight to each year. 
14.1 Loan loss ratio 
Loan loss ratio is the most essential key figure of a bank. A low ratio will mean that that the 
bank can carry on its business whereas a high ratio will endanger the survival of the bank. 
During the first few years of the 1980s Handelsbanken had slightly higher loan loss ratio than 
S-E-Banken but as from 1989 S-E-Banken has more or less continuously had the highest loan 
loss ratio. 
During the financial crisis of the early 1990s S-E-Banken had a marked higher loss ratio, as 
well as during the financial crisis of the 2000s which hit S-E-Banken fairly hard because of its 
involvement in the Baltic region but which did not affect Handelsbanken at all. 
The average loan loss ratio for the period 1982 – 2012 was: 
 Handelsbanken   0.48% 
 S-E-Banken    0.70%  
 Relative difference SHB to SEB -31% 
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14.2 Return on shareholders´equity 
The profitability of the bank is reflected in the return on shareholders´ equity which includes 
the net amount of all revenues and expenses of the bank in relation to its equity. 
With very few exceptions Handelsbanken has had a higher return on shareholders´equity 
during the entire period 1982 – 2012. 
The average return on equity for the period 1982 – 2012 was: 
 Handelsbanken   16.8% 
 S-E-Banken    12.8%  
 Relative difference SHB to SEB +31% 
 
 
14.3 Dividend in relation to equity 
The dividend reflects how well the bank can compensate the shareholders for their risk. 
With exception of the early 1990s Handelsbanken has had a higher dividend in relation to 
equity during the period 1982 – 2012. 
The average dividend related to equity for the period 1982 – 2012 was: 
 Handelsbanken   8.2% 
 S-E-Banken    6.8%  
 Relative difference SHB to SEB +21% 
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Dividend in relation to equity 
 
14.4 Equity ratio 
The equity ratio indicates how well the bank has been able to maintain its risk profile. 
The average equity ratio for the period 1982 – 2012 was: 
 Handelsbanken   4.2% 
 S-E-Banken    4.1%  
 Relative difference SHB to SEB +2% 
 
Handelsbanken only issued new capital in 1993 of 2.6 billion SEK whereas S-E-Banken has 
issued a total 24 billion SEK during 1982 – 2012. Handelsbanken has furthermore redeemed 
10 billion SEK during the period. 
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14.5 Primary capital ratio 2008 – 2012 according to Basel II rules 
The primary capital ratio indicates how well the bank has adjusted to the Basel regulations. 
The average primary capital ratio for the period 2008 – 2012 was: 
 Handelsbanken   16.1% 
 S-E-Banken    13.8%  
 Relative difference SHB to SEB +17% 
 
15 Analysis of organization, expansion, credit policy and risk profile 
15. 1 Handelsbanken has ever since Jan Wallander became President of the bank in 1970 had 
a decentralized organization with the granting of credits primarily made by the local branch 
offices. The branch offices are organized into independent regional banks. 
The bank has expanded its business primarily by organic growth. Relatively few major 
acquisitions of other banks have been made, the latest ones being Skånska Banken in 1990 
and Stadshypotek in 1997.. Over the last twenty years Handelsbanken has broadened its 
business by including life insurance but the 2001 acquisition of SPP was divested in 2007 
with a large capital gain. 
The expansion abroad has primarily occurred organically into the other Nordic countries and 
subsequently into Great Britain and the Netherlands. Regional banks have been established in 
each country when the establishment has reached a certain size. 
The credit policy of Handelsbanken is based on the local branch offices, which know the 
customers best. The individual branch offices are responsible to solve any problems arising, 
which means that business will be carried out with high risk awareness. Furthermore, 
additional risk control is carried out by the regional banks and the business areas.  
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The basic documents for a credit decision shall always be produced by the local branch office, 
which also goes for major credits. Borrowers shall generally have a high quality, which is far 
more important than an increase of the credit volume. 
If problems arise with a credit the close contact between the customer and the local branch 
office ensures faster reaction than if all credits were handled centrally. 
The risk profile of Handelsbanken means a historically low risk tolerance, which pertains to 
all departments of the bank. The general rule is that all credit risks will be taken by the local 
branch offices. All other risks should be minimized. Only in strictly defined customer related 
business the bank will accept a risk position within defined limits. 
Because of its strict risk profile the bank can be a stable business partner for the customers, 
also when the financial markets are under stress.  
15.2 S-E-Banken was created in 1972 by a merger of Stockholm´s Enskilda Bank and 
Skandinaviska Banken. The two banks were different in many ways with Enskilda Banken 
having a local Stockholm profile and with several major industrial companies as major 
companies. Skandinaviska Banken was more of a general retail bank with its business 
concentrated to western Sweden. The two banks kept their profiles for a long time. A common 
management was not established until 1990. 
Acquisitions in Sweden include Trygg-Hansa insurance company in 1997 which was 
subsequently divested. A merger with Swedbank was announced in 2001 but was stopped by 
the EU commission.   
Expansion abroad has been made primarily by acquisitions. Local banks in the three Baltic 
countries were acquired in the late 1990s. In 2000 a German bank was acquired and a bank in 
Ukraine in 2004. The German and Ukrainian banks were subsequently divested.  
The venture into the Baltic countries was based on a property bubble and ended with heavy 
credit losses for S-E-Banken when the financial crisis erupted in the late 2000s. Please refer to 
section 1.5.2 for further details. In order to reach a sufficient primary capital ratio the bank 
gave no dividend for 2008 and had to issue new share capital of 15 billion SEK in 2009. 
The credit policy of S-E-Banken is built upon the principle that a proper analysis shall be 
made of the customer´s cash flow and payment ability. The credit procedure for households 
and minor companies is made by a scoring system. Qualified credit analysis is made primarily 
for major companies. A credit limit is established for each individual customer. The total 
credit portfolio is analyzed in respect of branch of business, geography, risk class, product, 
size etc. 
The risk profile of S-E-Banken is based on independent functions for risk control, credit 
analysis and credit granting. A group business plan is compiled annually, which comprises an 
analysis of the risk profile combined with financing, liquidity and capital needs. The risk 
strategy is decided by the board and evaluates the risk profile in relation to the risk appetite of 
the board. 
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15.3 Comparison of Handelsbanken and S-E-Banken 1982 - 2012 
15.3.1 Organization 
Handelsbanken is basically a decentralized organization with the local branch offices 
responsible for the contacts with customer. 
S-E-Banken was created by a merger of Enskilda Banken and Skandinaviska Banken in 1972. 
Not until 1990 a common management was established, with a centralized organization. 
15.3.2 Acquisitions and expansion abroad 
Handelsbanken has made relatively few acquisitions, the latest domestic bank acquisitions 
being Skånska Banken in 1990 and Stadshypotek in 1997. The life insurance company SPP 
was acquired in 2001 and sold with a gain 2007. Expansion abroad has primarily been made 
organically with few acquisitions of local banks. 
S-E-Banken has made acquisitions and divestments at home as well as abroad. The insurance 
company Trygg-Hansa and banks in Germany and Ukraine have been bought and divested. 
Local banks were acquired in the three Baltic countries which ran into a major financial crisis 
in the 2000s. S-E-Banken had to issue new capital to compensate for its losses. 
15.3.3 Credit policy 
Handelsbanken bases the credit policy on the local offices, which know the customer best. All 
documents for a credit decision shall be produced by the local branch office. High credit 
quality is far more important than credit volume. 
S-E-Banken bases its credit decisions on cash flow and payment ability. Minor credits are 
decided by a scoring system. Qualified credit analysis is only made for major customers.  
15.3.4 Risk profile 
Handelsbanken has a historically low risk tolerance. All credit risk shall be taken by the local 
branch office. Only for strictly defined customer related business a risk position is accepted. 
S-E-Banken has separate functions for risk control, credit analysis and credit granting. The 
risk strategy is decided by the board which evaluates risk profile in relation to its risk appetite. 
15.3.5 Statistics of credit losses, profitability and capital ratios 
The statistics for the period 1982 – 2012 clearly shows the result of the policies of the two 
banks: 
- The average credit loss ratio of SHB was 31 percent lower than SEB 
- The return on shareholder´s equity of SHB was 31 percent higher than SEB 
- The dividend in relation to equity of SHB was 21 percent higher than SEB 
- Average equity ratio of SHB was 2 percent higher than SEB 
- Basel II primary capital ratio of SHB was 17 percent higher than SEB. 
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16 Interview with Anders Nyrén regarding Handelsbanken 
Anders Nyrén has been a member of the Handelsbanken board since 2001 and was elected 
chairman of the board in 2013. 
How would you describe the thorough change of the working procedures of Handelsbanken 
which were carried out by the new managing director Jan Wallander in the early 1970s? 
Decentralization is the key word, meaning a consequent and well organized system in order to 
manage the business. The local branch managers have a lot of freedom. Competition between 
branches and regional banks will lead to a focus on profitability. The reporting system is most 
essential with quick and accurate reports of the performance of the business. 
Handelsbanken has a special procedure with a big responsibility for the local branch office 
when granting credits and with the continued contacts with the customer- How do you think 
this has influenced the risk awareness of the organization? 
The awareness of risk is most evident in the bank. Each branch office or regional bank 
measures its own performance. Therefore Handelsbanken aims to select customers being low-
risk and profitable. The low risk profile will also benefit the customers. 
Has the profit sharing system within Oktogonen meant that that the employees are more 
involved in Handelsbanken? 
Oktogonen is a unique system for profit sharing as all employees receive the same amount 
which is not redeemable until retirement. This ensures loyalty and a long-run perspective. 
Handelsbanken often underlines the low tolerance of risk in its business. Can you illustrate 
this with some occasions in which the low risk acceptance has benefitted the bank? 
· The former management of Handelsbanken wanted to invest in Eastern Europe in the 
early 2000s but the board of directors did not accept the proposal. 
· In the first quarter 2007 a profitable stock trading in the United States was wound up 
as Handelsbanken realized that a financial crisis was being built up. 
· The sale of SPP in 2007 was made in the right time at a considerable gain.  
You are also a member of the central credit committee. How does it work? 
There are certain limits to lending which require a decision by the credit committee. The local 
branch office and the regional bank have always prepared the request very well. The 
discussion in the committee is useful for the branch manager as background information. 
The expansion abroad of Handelsbanken has taken place in many small steps by minor 
acquisitions and establishment of new branch offices. Will this strategy be maintained? 
The strategy which has been very successful will certainly be maintained. The regional banks 
which have been established during the last decade in Great Britain and the Netherlands fit 
very well into the structure as those countries are quite similar to the Nordic countries. 
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17 Interview with Erik Röjvall regarding financial risk 
Erik Röjvall has worked as a financial analyst and investment manager of Industrivärden 
since 2000 with focus on the financial sector in general and follow-up of Handelsbanken in 
particular. 
How would you describe how a bank is financed nowadays? 
Lending is financed by deposits and by bond issues, which are either secured regarding for 
example housing loans or unsecured. International financing by bonds means that lending is 
not restricted by the domestic pool of deposits. However, this has created a dependence of the 
international capital markets and therefore a need of trust from the bond holders. The 
funding/financing of banks has become ever more international with an increased importance 
for the bond holders. 
When a financial crisis arises the value of the assets of the banks will be questioned and 
thereby also the value of the bank´s equity. The interbank market might lose confidence of the 
bank as well as the public by withdrawing their deposits which will put strain on the liquidity. 
The bond investors will be less interested in acquiring bonds which will give rise to a liquidity 
crisis. In other words if the solvency is questioned this will lead to a loss of confidence and 
thereby to a liquidity crisis. The banks might have to issue new equity capital in order to 
create confidence from the bond investors. Also the central bank may have to give liquidity 
support in order for the banks to redeem the bonds upon maturity. 
Today most American banks have less than 10 percent equity of total assets and many 
European banks have less than 5 percent. Many academics argue that banks should have an 
equity ratio of 20 to 30 percent, which would considerably diminish the risk level in the 
banking sector and thereby demand a lower level of return on equity. What is your opinion? 
An increased equity ratio certainly means lower risk. A large increase of equity would, 
however, demand capital injections in combination with lower assets which would limit the 
lending capacity. There would be negative effects on the real economy and its growth. The 
process to increase bank equity will therefore take long time and also demands that the 
owners are financially strong. A scenario analysis of future possible crises in combination 
with legal demands will decide how the process will evolve over time. 
Basel II rules define risk capital and risk weighted assets. The capital shall be a minimum of 8 
percent of assets. The banks are allowed to choose the method to measure credit risk, market 
risk and operational risk. Certain banks have adopted methods for risk measurement which 
were not sufficient during the financial crisis of 2007 – 2009. Which are your comments? 
Basel II rules meant a refinement of risk measurement. The models used by banks were based 
on many years of statistics and were thoroughly scrutinized by the authorities. However, the 
risk was not fully taken into consideration. The new Basel III rules also include e.g. demands 
on liquidity and special capital demands for trading among other things. 
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Basel III rules which will not be in operation until 2019 will require a minimum primary 
capital of 7 percent of risk weighted assets plus a buffer of 2.5 percent and a total of 13 
percent of primary and secondary capital of risk weighted assets. Are these demands 
sufficient according to your opinion? 
The requirements are well balanced. However, it must be pointed out that Sweden has even 
tighter requirements with a minimum of 10 percent in primary capital as from 2013 and 12 
percent as from 2015. From a competition point of view it is important that the rules are 
neutral between countries. 
Even with Basel III rules the equity ratio can be as low as 3 – 5 percent. Do you think that 
further regulations are needed? 
A capital demand that does not take into consideration the risk of the borrower might 
stimulate high-risk lending to a risky business before low-risk lending to the central bank.  
Handelsbanken has been characterized by a low risk profile ever since the present model of 
lending and follow-up was introduced in the early 1970s. My comparison of Handelsbanken 
and S-E-banken for the period 1982 – 2012 clearly shows lower loan loss ratio, higher return 
on shareholders´ equity, higher dividend in relation to equity and lower equity issues in 
average for Handelsbanken. Which are your comments? 
The low risk model was introduced by Jan Wallander in 1970 and has been in force ever 
since. Both the customers, bond holders, owners and employees have benefited from this. 
Handelsbanken continuously compares its return on shareholders´ equity and the 
performance of the Handelsbanken share with other Swedish and Scandinavian banks. The 
aim is to outperform the competitors on the home market. What do you think about this? 
The goal is very clear and simple for the whole organization. It stimulates wise decisions, low 
risk, avoids adventurous risk taking and benefits all parties including the owners. 
In which way have you experienced the low risk in your contacts with Handelsbanken? 
The low risk profile embodies the whole organization. Handelsbanken only accepts a zero 
loan loss ratio, whereas most other banks accept a “normalized” loss ratio. The low risk model 
has meant that Handelsbanken has been able to avoid both state support and issue of new 
equity during a long period of time in order to withstand financial stress during crises. 
Today the financial sector is very complex and globally integrated. Disruptions have a 
tendency to spread in several steps as in 2008. In the US complex legislations like Sarbane-
Oxley and Dodd-Frank have been introduced lately but without any major effect. Comments? 
The financial authorities have implemented more requirements and the inspection is tighter. If 
a crisis occurs the authorities are prepared to take over a bank at short notice. However, 
problems in the banking sector generally originate from the quality of the assets. The 
authorities can only regulate capital and liquidity requirements. Sound lending is the basis of 
healthy banking! 
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18 Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper is to verify or nullify the hypothesis that low risk pays in the long 
run in the banking sector. 
During the last few decades major losses have occurred in the banking sector, basically due to 
high or extremely high risk taking. Examples of this are frauds like the sole trader Nick 
Leeson who brought down Barings Bank in 1995 by speculating in a Japanese stock index and 
then hiding his losses by false accounting. The investment manager Bernie Madoff was 
sentenced to 150 years in jail in 2009 after having embezzled 18 billion dollars in a so called 
Ponzi scheme. Another example is the French trader Jerome Kerviel who was sentenced to 
five years in prison after having exceeded his mandate in trading with a German stock index 
which caused Sociéte´Generale a loss of 5 billion euros. The Swedish H Q Bank lost its 
banking licence in 2010 after having hidden trading losses by faulty evaluation techniques. 
The 2008 global financial crisis which began in the US and spread to Europe was basically 
caused by unacceptable risk taking as many banks had invested heavily in highly complex 
derivatives like collateralized debt obligations and other mortgage backed securities. There 
was generally limited knowledge of the risk profile of the new financial instruments. When 
the American investment bank Lehman Brothers, which was heavily exposed to the derivative 
market, went bankrupt in 2008 there was a global financial turmoil. In Sweden the investment 
bank Carnegie was taken over by the state. The three major Icelandic banks were also 
nationalized. The economy of most countries went into recession. The recession is still 
prevailing in several countries in the Eurozone, which are unable to devalue their currencies. 
When comparing the performance of Handelsbanken and S-E-Banken from a risk point of 
view it is obvious that Handelsbanken has a much lower risk profile as can be seen in detail in 
section 15.  
Handelsbanken has a decentralized organization, has made relatively few large acquisitions, is 
expanding organically abroad, has a credit policy based on responsibility by the local branch 
office and basically accepts a risk position only for customer related business. Support from 
the state has never been an issue. 
S-E-Banken has a centralized organization, has made several aggressive acquisitions followed 
by divestments, has a credit policy based on a scoring system and even evaluates its risk 
position based on the “risk appetite” of the board. In 1993 the bank was very close to need 
support from the state in order to survive. 
The statistics for the period 1982 – 2012 as detailed in section 14 clearly speaks in favour of 
Handelsbanken both in regard of credit loss ratio, return on shareholders´equity, dividend in 
relation to equity and Basel II primary capital ratio. Also, Handelsbanken has issued far less 
new equity capital than S-E-Banken over the last thirty years. 
My conclusions are that banking generally is a risky business, as detailed in section 1, but also 
that low risk can pay in the long run in the Swedish banking sector. The hypothesis of this 
paper is thus verified. 
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Enclosure A. The establishment and winding-up of Securum 
In the autumn of 1991 it was obvious that Nordbanken needed new capital in order to reach 
the capital requirements. A winding-up company called Securum was separated from 
Nordbanken in order to handle possible losses referring to some 3,000 loans to 1,274 
companies. Securum received a share capital of 24 billion SEK, credits from the state of 27 
billion SEK and a guarantee of another 10 billion SEK (Bergström et al: Slutsatser och 
sammanfattning, p. 5). 
There were strong reasons not to hurry up the winding-up of the credit portfolio, which would 
probably have resulted in major losses. It was therefore better to use a special vehicle to wind 
up the assets and give Securum an open mandate for the procedure. 
Securum was given fairly free hands by the state. However, there was a risk of conflict of 
interest between the owner and the employees, as Securum was a temporary organization 
which would exist only for a few years (Bergström et al p. 6). 
There was a considerable risk that key employees and customers would leave the companies 
with bad loans. Some 70 percent of the companies included in the credit portfolio of Securum 
were in bankruptcy or liquidation already in mid-1994. The companies were not profitable 
and had a 90 percent probability of failure. 
When the credits had been wound up and the assetswere transferred to Securum, a new 
effective financial and operative structure was established. New management was often 
established. Restructuring took place by mergers and sale of assets. Most of the companies 
improved their earnings considerably only a few years after the reconstruction (Bergström et 
al p. 6). 
The life-span of Securum was originally estimated to 10-15 years, but it was soon obvious 
that the winding-up procedure could be concluded much faster. Most of the real properties 
were sold as companies.    
Securum made five public offerings, of which three were property companies, namely 
Norrporten, Castellum and Pandox. In hindsight the offerings of Norrporten and Castellum 
were made at too low prices, as the price level had risen only marginally from the bottom 
level in 1992 (Bergström et al p. 7). 
There have been made several calculations of the cost borne by the Swedish state in order to 
stabilize the banking sector in the early 1990s. The total cost up to 1997 is estimated to some 
30-35 billion SEK. However, a calculation made a few years later indicate that the losses were 
almost entirely absorbed.  
Nordbanken transferred assets booked at 67 billion SEK to Securum. At the end of 1993 the 
assets had been written down to 33 billion SEK. Without the creation of Securum Nordbanken 
would not have survived (Östrup et al p. 208).  
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Interview with Anders Nyrén regarding Securum 
Mr Nyrén was managing director of OM International when he was asked in 1992 by Lars 
Thunell, then executive vice president of Nordbanken, how the bad loans of Nordbanken 
should best be handled. The solution was to create a bad bank for the non-performing loans. 
Mr Nyrén became chief financial officer of Securum with Mr Thunell as managing director. 
Do you think that Bergström et al have given good description of the creation and operation 
of Securum? 
The authors do not seem to have fully grasped the procedure. Non-performing loans of 67 
billion SEK in Nordbanken were transferred to assets in Securum by a procedure which we 
called the credit transformation (“kreditkrossen”). In a second phase the assets, normally 
companies or properties, were taken over by Securum, which essentially was an industrial 
holding company. In 1994 Securum was refinanced and Nordbanken was no longer a lender 
to Securum. There were no Nordbanken people on the board or management of Securum. 
The original loans were valuated to the market value of the corresponding assets. Many of 
Securum´s assets were in the exit phase sold in packages, in several cases via public offerings.  
What was the background to the banking crisis in the early 1990s? Could the authorities have 
acted differently in order to calm down the economy? 
The banking system was not ready when the regulations of interest and currency were 
abolished. The authorities could have raised the interest and the capital demands of banks. 
Also there was no regulation for the finance companies.     
The winding-up procedure of the credits taken over by Securum was very quick and many 
companies became liquidated or put in bankruptcy? Was reconstruction not an alternative? 
Reconstruction was not an option because that would have been a long and uncertain 
procedure. The idea was to act fast in order to regain as much of the underlying value as 
possible. 
There were several public offerings of the assets “packaged” by Securum. Comments? 
The commercial properties were sold as Castellum and Kungsleden. The properties in 
northern Sweden were sold as Norrporten. A number of hotels were sold as Pandox. Also 
Securum became a major owner of Nobel Industrier, Fabege and Klövern, which were sold. 
As an average the result of the sales was good but some transactions were a bit premature.  
There must have been too generous lending by Nordbanken to many investors. Comments? 
Several well established people invested in “cheap” properties abroad but made heavy losses 
in the devaluation in 1992. Also there were signs of too generous lending from some branches 
and we even reported possible faults to the authorities. A special authority (“Ekobrotts- 
myndigheten”) was later created in order to deal with criminal financial activities. 
